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THE MACROECONOMICS OF A WAGE
EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Concept
A third of a century after Keynes' [14] perception of it, the
idea of a wage earners' investment fund is re-emerging in Western
Europe. Serving the dual purpose of giving labor a share of,
first, the capital gains accruing to stockholders in an inflation-
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ary economy and second, the co-determination rights inherent
in stock ownership, a wage earners' investment fund would work
as follows. Primarily in the form of corporate stock employers
would contribute compulsorily a fraction of either their wage
bill or their profits bill to the fund. Let us call the former
contribution an investment wage, the latter profit sharing.
The fund would belong to the employees and would issue
nonnegotiable fund certificates to them. A specified number of
years after its issue a fund certificate would become redeemable
in cash at a price which would include the share of that certif-
icate in the original contribution to the fund and and all
capital gains and dividends made on that contribution during the
lifetime of the certificate. The fund would be allowed to sell
contributed corporate stock at any time and buy other stock.
The mechanism of such fund generation, and the macroecon-
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omic effects of it, is a largely unmet challenge to economic
theory. The purpose of the present article is to explore the
grounds and offer tentative suggestions. A careful distinction
between the investment wage and profit sharing will be maintained,
and significant differences in effects will be found. Mathemat-
ics will be used sparingly and merely as an aid in formulating
concepts. For an operational use of mathematics as a tool to
specify and solve a self-contained model of a wage earners'
investment fund, the reader is referred to [5] and [6].
2. The Plans
2
A compulsory investment wage was first proposed by Keynes
[14] in 1940. With the purpose of paring down consumer demand
to wartime output of consumers' goods, Keynes proposed a
"deferred-pay" scheme calling for £550 million in annual com-
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pulsory saving. The complete scheme, including "the accumulation
of working-class wealth under working-class control," would
embody, Keynes said in his preface, "an advance towards economic
equality greater than any which we have made in recent times."
Keynes* proposal was adopted strictly as a wartime measure and
to less than a quarter of his suggested sum, Maital [17], 166.
Compulsory profit sharing was first proposed by Gleitze
[12] in 1957. Employers should never be deprived of the use of
capital, he said. Hence, in the form of corporate stock or bonds
rather than in the form of cash, employers should contribute
compulsorily a fraction of their profits bill to the fund. Later
German labor thinking, beginning with Biittner [7], moved away
from contributions in the form of bonds: If free to choose,
a firm whose internal rate of return were greater than the bond
rate would choose to contribute bonds; a firm whose internal
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rate of return were less than the bond rate would choose to
contribute stock. Thus the fund would find its portfolio com-
posed of first-rate bonds but second-rate stock. Moreover,
one of the purposes of a wage earners* investment fund was to
give labor a share of the capital gains accruing to firms
under inflation, and none are made on bonds.
According to Gleitze, the fund should issue nonnegotiable
fund certificates to all employees. At invalidity, retirement,
or a specified number of years after its issue a fund certificate
should become redeemable in cash. In 1961 the Gleitze Plan was
endorsed by Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German federation of
labor unions) [9] but only after two significant modifications,
i. e., first, that contributions should be in the form of stock,
not bonds, second, that fund certificates should be redeemable
at any time.
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3. Th_e Bills
In 1973 a bill proposing a compulsory investment wage
failed to pass in the Danish parliament. The bill, Arbejdsmin -
isteriet [1] was a modified union proposal, Landsorganisationen
[16]. Both proposed a contribution fraction of 5%. The bill
proposed a redemption period of seven years, whereas the union
proposal had proposed a five-year redemption period.
In 1974 the German coalition government published the
principles [10] of a bill proposing compulsory profit sharing.
Contributions were to be in the form of corporate stock or,
subject to a penalty, cash. Smaller firms were exempt. The
contribution fraction was to be progressive, reaching a maximum
of 10%. Reversing Buttner and going back to Gleitze, the
coalition government proposed a seven-year redemption period.
An actual bill was not put before parliament, and the matter
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was declared to be a dormant one by the subsequent Schmidt
cabinet.
4. The Statutes
A voluntary investment-wage scheme was enacted by the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 [20], 111-136. The scheme
was revised twice and is now so appealing that a majority of
German wage earners is participating. Contributions may take
the form of stock, bonds, or cash as agreed, may be agreed upon
within a maximum of 62** DM per annum, and are generously supplem-
ented by government cash subsidies. The redemption period is
seven years.
A compulsory profit-sharing scheme for larger corporations
was enacted by France in 1967 [20], 79-80 and 92-95. Contrib-
utions may take the form of stock, bonds, or cash as agreed and
entitle the firm to an equivalent tax relief. The redemption
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period is five years
.
II. NOTATION
1 . Variables
$ = size of wage earners' investment fund
g E proportionate rate of growth of variable v = P , W , or Z
X = internal rate of return
k = physical marginal productivity of capital stock
P = price of good
S = physical capital stock
V7 = wage bill including employers' contribution to fund per year
X = physical output
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Y = disposable money income
Z = profits bill including employers* contribution to fund per
year
2 . Parameters
a = employers' contribution to fund as a fraction of wage bill
a, 3 = exponents of Cobb-Douglas production function
b = employers' contribution to fund as a fraction of profits bill
e = Euler's number, the base of natural logarithms
p = redemption period
w = money wage rate including employers'* contribution to fund
per man year
Time coordinates are t and x.
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III. THE GENERATION OF THE FUND
In the form of corporate stock let all employers contribute
compulsorily either the fraction a of their wage bill W or the
fraction b of their profits bill Z to a wage earners* investment
fund. The fund will be growing for two reasons. First, what
is being put into it is growing: The wage bill or the profits
bill themselves are growing at the proportionate rates gM and
g , respectively. Second, once put in, the contributions will
Li
be put to good use and earn a return. Assume wage earners to
have the same motivation and skill as capitalist-entrepreneurs
hence, like the latter, to be making the internal rate of return
1 on the money value of the capital stock they own, i. e., the
wage earners' investment fund. Let the earnings of the fund be
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compounded continuously > and let all wage earners present their
fund certificates for redemption as soon as the latter become
redeemable. Redemption at time T is the accumulated value at
time T of the contribution made at time x - p, where p is the
redemption period. The size of the fund at time T is the
accumulated value at time T of all contributions made from t =
x - p to t = x . Under steady-state growth that accumulated
value may be expressed in terms of the wage or profits bill at
time T, respectively:
(l - g )(T - t)
(la) $(t) = /I rt e
w
aW(x)dt
T - p
(1 - g7 )(x - t)
(lb) $(x) = S
T _
e
* bZ(x)dt
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IV. THE GENERATION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME
1. Wage Earners
All wage earners were assumed to present their fund
certificates for redemption as soon as the latter become
redeemable. Redemption at time t is the accumulated value
at time T of the contribution made at time T - p, where p
is the redemption period. Under an investment wage define
labor's disposable income at time x as the wage bill minus
contribution plus redemption at that time:
(l ~ SW >P(2a) Y^Cx) = W(x) - aW(x) + e aW(x)
J.
Under profit sharing define it as merely the wage bill
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plus redemption at that time:
(\ - g7 )p(2b) Y^T) = W(T) + e bZ(x)
2
.
Capitalist- Entrepreneurs
The capitalist-entrepreneurs are making the internal rate of
return I on the money value of the capital stock they own, i. e.,
all capital stock minus the wage earners' investment fund. In a
neoclassical one-good world of immortal capital stock, the
internal rate of return i includes profits made at the rate
of the physical marginal productivity of capital k plus capital
gains made at the rate of inflation g :
(3) 1 = K + gp
Let us follow convention and exclude capital gains from
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the disposable income of capitalist-entrepreneurs. Under an
investment wage their disposable income is, then, their profits
on all capital stock minus the fund:
(4a) Y
2
E k(PS - 0)
Under profit sharing their disposable income is their
profits on all capital stock minus the fund minus their contrib
ution to the fund:
(4b) Y
2
= k(PS - 0) - bZ
3. Two Biases
The definitions of disposable income just adopted have two
biases built into them, both understating labor's thriftiness.
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The first bias is the assumption that all wage earners
present their fund certificates for redemption as soon as the
latter become redeemable. Will they? Evidence to the effect
that they will not is available from fairly long German
experience with voluntary schemes but is not necessarily
indicative of behavior under compulsory ones, Robinson [20],
126-127. A hint of impatience may, perhaps, be found in union
attitudes to the length of the redemption period under proposed
compulsory schemes. A redemption period of zero assured union
endorsement of the Gleitze Plan in 1961, but a redemption period
of seven years assured agreement within the German coalition
government in 1974. A redemption period of five years was
proposed by Danish unions but was lengthened to seven years in
the Danish bill of 1973.
Keynes would have questioned the assumption that all wage
earners present their fund certificates for redemption as soon
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as the latter become redeemable:
The argument is, I suppose, that savings deferred in this way
are more likely than normal savings to be spent by their owners
as soon as they are free to do so. How far this will prove to
be true in fact, I am not sure. It may be that the blocked
deposits will be instrumental in spreading the habit of small
savings more widely... Cl^]» 47.
The second bias is that while capital gains were excluded from
the disposable income of capitalist-entrepreneurs an exclusion
3
well anchored in convention the redemption of a fund certif-
icate included the share of that certificate in the original
contribution to the fund and all capital gains and dividends made
on that contribution during the lifetime of the certificate. Re-
demption thus defined was a component part of labor's disposable
income. Maybe such inclusion can be justified by the fund's
indirectness and remoteness. But maybe the inclusion of the
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original contribution and the capital gains made on it does over-
state disposable labor income as conceived by labor itself.
Both biases represent extremes: Wage earners can redeem
after but never before the expiration of the redemption period.
Of the original contribution and the capital gains made on it,
wage earners could consider as disposable income less but never
more than 100 per cent. Both biases, then, are bound to under-
state the thriftiness of wage earners. The wage earner might well
be mere reluctant to redeem and more reluctant to spend what is
redeemed.
How reluctant could well depend upon the particular design
of the wage earners* investment fund. A large centralized fund
like the Danish proposed one [1] might appear remote and
indirect to the wage earner. Unable to identify with it, he
might treat its disbursements as he would any other transfer
income. By contrast , the German proposal [10] visualized a
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number of funds among which the wage earner could choose freely.
Such freedom of choice would make the fund look less remote and
more trustworthy to the wage earner, hence would make him more
reluctant to redeem and more reluctant to spend what is redeemed.
4. Computer Simulation
The full macroeconomics of a wage earners' investment fund
is complicated. One is tempted, therefore, to try to specify
and solve simple self-contained mathematical models of it,
permitting computer simulation. Incorporating the two biases
just mentioned, the writer gave in to that temptation. Two
alternative funds were considered, one financed by an invest-
ment wage [6], one financed by profit sharing [5]. Both
were examined within the framework of a one-good neoclassical
steady-state growth model [*0, Ch. 5, with immortal capital
stock in a Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming a labor
exponent of 3/ 1*, a capital-stock exponent of 1/U, a propensity to
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consume national disposable real income of 7/8, a zero growth
rate of the labor force, and a technological progress of 3% per
annum. The effects upon steady-state disposable incomes of
a wage earners' investment fund with a redemption period of
p 8 years are summarized in Figure 1.
Here, the horizontal axis shows the contribution to the
fund as a fraction of national output. Under a linearly homo-
geneous Cobb-Douglas production function with labor and capital
exponents of a and 3* respectively, the wage bill W is the fract-
ion a and the profits bill 2 the fraction 3 of national output PX
Consequently, an investment wage will contribute the fraction
aa and profit sharing the fraction 3b of national output PX.
The vertical axis of Figure 1 shows national disposable income,
labor's disposable income, and the capitalist-entrepreneurs'
disposable income, all three as fractions of national output.
Three results stand out in Figure 1. First, an investment
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wage and a profit-sharing scheme contributing the same fractions
ota = 3b of national output reduce the national disposable-income
fraction of national output identically. Second, both the invest-
ment wage and profit sharing redistribute disposable income in
labor's favor. But, third, the investment wage has a much weaker
redistributive effect than has profit sharing.
5. Shiftability
Why such a difference? To be true, both contributions are
collected from the employer. But under full employment the in-
vestment wage can be shifted, while profit sharing cannot. The
investment wage is a fraction of the wage bill, consequently a
man not hired costs no investment wage. Let the money wage rate
w be raised by the investment wage. Only if this raises the
price of goods P in the same proportion could the real wage rate
w/P remain equal to physical marginal productivity of labor at
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full employment. But if the investment wage is thus shifted to the
price of goods P, how can it redistribute disposable income in
labor's favor at all? Well, labor may be paying its own investment
wage in the form of a higher price of goods, but labor still earns
the internal rate of return on it and capitalist-entrepreneurs do
not cf. the last term of Eq. (2a) and the term K$ of Eq. (4a).
No shifting could occur under profit sharing. Here, employers
maximize (1 - b)Z, i. e. profits after contribution but before div-
idends. And the same employment which maximizes profits Z will
maximize the fraction 1 - b of it.
V. THE PROPENSITY TO SAVE NATIONAL OUTPUT
1. A Third Bias
As a third bias this one overstating labor's thriftiness
assume that the propensity to consume disposable real
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income is unaffected by the introduction of the wage earners'
investment fund and the same for wage earners' and capitalist
-entrepreneurs. Since income transferred to a wage earners'
investment fund makes that income nondisposable for the durat-
ion of the redemption period, national disposable income is now
a smaller fraction of national output, and the propensity to
save national output is unequivocally up.
The first two biases were understatements, the third one is
an overstatement of labor's thriftiness. The extent of the
first two is less well known than that of the third. The extent
to which the three will cancel is, therefore, unknown. But
their net effect may come closer to the truth than that of
using the first two plus correct propensities for wage earners
and capitalist-entrepreneurs. So the writer put all three bias-
es into his computer simulation [5] and [6], already mentioned.
As a result, the introduction of a wage earners' investment fund
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with a redemption period of p = 8 years would have the following
effects upon the steady-state propensity to save national output:
An investment wage with a contribution fraction of a = 1/20 would
raise it from 0.125 to 0.137. Frofit sharing with a contribution
fraction of b = 1/10 would raise it from 0.125 to 0.133.
Since in such simulation an investment wage and a profit
-sharing scheme contributing the same fraction aa = 3b of national
output reduced the national disposable-income fraction of national
output identically, it did not matter whether the contribution
took one form or the other.
2 . Different Propensities to Consume Disposable Real Income
But once we try to remove our third bias it may matter. Both
an investment wage and profit sharing ultimately redistribute dis-
posable income in favor of the wage earners. But Figure 1 showed
that the investment wage had a much weaker redistributive effect
/
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than had profit sharing. Now let the first two biases be incon-
sequential but the third one be serious: Let wage earners have a
substantially higher propensity to consume disposable real income
than do capitalist-entrepreneurs. Then redistributing income from
the latter to the former may conceivably overwhelm the effect of
reducing the national disposable-income fraction of national output,
and the net effect may be a fall in the propensity to save national
output. The fall is less likely to result under an investment wage
with its weaker redistributive effect than under profit sharing.
We need not trace familiar neoclassical consequences: A high-
er propensity to save national output would mean higher capital
intensity, a higher real wage rate, and a lower physical marginal
productivity of capital. Nor do we need to trace familiar fiscal
-policy consequences of government cash subsidies or tax relief,
offered as inducements to fund formation under German and French
statute cf. Sec. I, 4 above.
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VI. THE INDUCEMENT TO INVEST
*• Equity Capital , Borrowed Capital , and Self -Financing
What is the price of capital to the firm? To be marketable,
corporate stock must offer a prospect of dividends and capital
gain. To the firm, then, offering such a prospect is the price
to be paid for equity capital. Interest is the price to be paid
for borrowed capital. Neither price has to be paid for self
-financing, hence the firm's preference for the latter. The risk-
ier the investment project considered, the stronger the preference
The fact that equity capital, borrowed capital, and self
-financing do not carry the same price tags becomes crucial under
a wage earners' investment fund to which firms conti^ibute in the
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form of corporate stock. To be true, no cash is contributed,
so the cash equivalent of the contribution is still available
for financing in accordance with Gleitze's leading idea.
But the contribution has generated new equity. Perhaps it would
help to visualize the contribution as follows: The firm would
contribute cash to the fund, then issue new stock and sell it
to the fund in order to recover the lost cash. The firm ends
up with the cash and the fund with stock, as they should, but
it has become more transparent that a wage earners' investment
fund simply forces the firm to give up some of its self-financing
5
and to resort to equity financing.
2 . Does the Fund Insist upon Return Maximization ?
But would a wage earners' investment fund really be like any
other stockholder unwilling to hold stock not offering a prospect
of dividends and capital gain? Is the fund always on the lookout
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for high-return stock, always trying to get rid of low-return
stock?
First, it may well be. Existing and proposed wage earners'
investment funds are entitled to buy and sell securities as they
see fit. Indeed, sometimes return maximization is explicitly
prescribed. The Danish union proposal, Landsorganisation en [16],
Sec. iu , as well as the Danish bill, Arbe jdsministeriet [1], Sec.
22, specifically demanded an "active" placement of the fund and
defined "active" as guaranteeing, first, a share of the capital
gains of the economy and, second, a maximum dividend. Even when
not prescribed, return maximization may be likely, especially
if a number of competing, decentralized funds were set up among
which the individual wage earner would be free to choose as
he would according to the German coalition government proposal
[10].
Second, whatever the motivation of the fund may be, the fund
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will at least have to sell stock to meet its redemption obligat-
ions. Stock originally contributed to the fund will then fall
into the hands of ordinary stockholders unwilling to hold it
unless it offers a prospect of dividends and capital gain. Should
they sell it its market value would suffer, jeopardizing the
marketability of future stock issues by the same firm.
We conclude that offering a prospect of dividends and capital
gain would indeed be a price to be paid by a firm contributing
equity to a wage earners' investment fund. If it is true that
the riskier the investment project considered, the stronger is the
firm's preference for self-financing, then a wage earners' invest-
ment fund will induce the firm to substitute less risky for more
risky projects. This could decelerate technological progress.
3. Investment Wage and Profit Sharing Compared
Figure 1 showed that the investment wage had a much weaker
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redistributive effect than profit sharing, because unlike profit
sharing, the investment wage can be shifted to the price of the
product. Such shifting would retrieve some of the lost self
-financing. Consequently, the pressure forcing the firm to give
up some of its self-financing and resort to equity financing is
lower under the investment wage than under profit sharing.
VII. THE GENERATION OF WORKING-CLASS WEALTH
Could a wage earners* investment fund become so large and
powerful that it would turn firms into worker-owned Vanek-like
[21] or Bergstrom-like [2] ones? We have already mentioned,
in Sec. VI, 2, that return maximization by the fund may be either
explicitly prescribed or likely to evolve.
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Regardless of the motivation of the fund, however, proposed
and enacted wage earners ' investment funds are hardly controlling
ones. Our Eqs. (la) and (lb) expressed the size of the fund in
terms of the wage or profits bill, respectively. So for empirically
plausible contribution fractions and redemption period, our com-
puter simulation [5] and [6] makes it easy to find the steady
-state size of the fund as a fraction of capital stock. For a
redemption period p = 8 years an investment wage with a contribut-
ion fraction of a = 1/20 would generate a fund equalling 0.100 of
capital stock. Profit sharing with a contribution fraction of
b = 1/10 would generate a fund equalling 0.069 of capital stock.
Such funds would be large enough to make sizeable dents in the
inequality of wealth distribution, but not large enough to estab-
lish labor control of industry.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This article has examined macroeconomic effects of two forms
of a wage earners' investment fund, i. e., one financed by an
investment wage, the other by profit sharing. Six tentative
conclusions are suggested. First, the fund reduces the national
disposable-income fraction of national output. Second, the fund
redistributes disposable income in labor's favor. Third, the
investment wage has a much weaker redistributive effect than has
profit sharing. Fourth, the fund may raise the propensity to save
national output. Fifth, by narrowing the firm's opportunity for
self-financing the fund may induce it to substitute less risky for
more risky investment projects. Sixth, the fund redistributes
wealth in labor's favor but, within a practical range, not enough
to establish labor control of industry.
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FOOTNOTES
Always assuming a zero redemption period, recent German theoretic-
al work on redistribution of wealth ignores fund generation, hence
expects a negative effect on the propensity to save national output,
Jaeger [13], Krelle , Schunck, and Siebke [15], 52-86, Miickl [18],
and Ramser [19]. Is not redistribution of wealth with a zero
redemption period like Hamlet without the prince?
Fund generation was ignored by neither Forsyth [11] nor the
Danish Council of Economic Advisers [8]. Forsyth merely expected
it to prevent a drop but never mentioned a rise in the propensity
to save national output, [11], 66 and 72. The Danish Council
did expect fund generation to raise substantially the propensity
to save national output, [8], 43, 49. Robinson [20] offered
description rather than analysis.
2Continental literature on wage earners' investment funds seems
unaware of Keynes' paternity.
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3Bhatia [3] found a marginal propensity to consume capital gains
of 0.06 highly significant statistically but less than one
-tenth of a marginal propensity to consume income of 0.70 to 0.80.
14.
As found by Jaeger [13], Krelle [15], Miickl [18], and Ramser
[19] by always assuming a zero redemption period. Their result
might well have been reversed by the introduction of a positive
redemption period resulting in the accumulation of a x^age earners'
investment fund.
5
It is misleading, therefore, to imply that the firm's liquidity
is not affected by contribution in the form of corporate stock
as Gleitze [12] and Bergstrom [2], 62, do. To be true,
Bergstrom's redemption period is infinite, but his wage earners'
investment fund is explicitly a return maximizer.
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